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Inventing a New Kind of German: 
The BBC German Service and the Bombing War1 
 
EMILY OLIVER  
 
‘Nation shall speak peace unto nation.’ This was the BBC’s founding motto in 1927. 
Barely twelve years later, Britain was once again at war with Germany, and the 
BBC’s German Service was to play a strategic part in Britain’s psychological warfare 
efforts. This chapter examines the Service’s output during the later years of the 
Second World War in order to ask two key questions: how do you speak unto a nation 
that doesn’t want to hear you? And how do you speak peace unto a nation whose 
cities you are carpet-bombing? This chapter examines the style of communication the 
BBC adopted in order to reach Germans, and how it reconciled its mission to 
broadcast accurate, objective information about the war with communicating the 
uncomfortable truth that Allied air raids were killing thousands of German civilians. It 
begins with a brief overview of the German Service’s early history with particular 
reference to its intended listenership, before analysing a number of features scripts in 
order to show that the BBC German Service’s portrayal of the bombing war was 
closely bound up with its (imagined) target audience of ‘ordinary Germans’. I argue 
that comical and satirical features played a key role in softening the blow of bombing 
reports and convincing Germans that Britain had their best interests at heart. 
 
The Voice of Britain 
                                                 
1 This work was funded by the Leverhulme Trust through a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship. All 
translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
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The BBC German Service was founded somewhat hastily in 1938, when Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain wished to broadcast his speech on the Munich Crisis in 
several different languages, including German. At first operating on an ad hoc basis, 
then as a sub-section of the BBC Features Department, the German Service finally 
became a department in its own right on 16 April 1939, with five hours and fifteen 
minutes of allotted daily air time.2 In October 1940, a twenty-nine-year-old 
Englishman was placed in charge of the German Service: Hugh Carleton Greene, 
brother of novelist Graham Greene, was fluent in German, having previously worked 
as the Daily Telegraph’s Berlin correspondent. He proceeded to restructure the 
Service, adding features, satire, and other formats to its hitherto limited output, while 
retaining the key focus on news and commentary. By the end of 1941, Greene had 
given the German Service the shape it would retain until the end of the war, and the 
entire department moved to Bush House, where it would remain until its closure in 
1999. Through chairing daily programme meetings, Greene succeeded in turning a 
heterogeneous group of British, German, and Austrian writers, journalists, academics, 
politicians, directors, and actors into an efficient broadcasting team. Over the course 
of the Second World War, the German Service’s importance continued to increase, as 
did its allotted air time. 
One of Greene’s first innovations was to change the German Service’s 
introductory announcement from its neutral ‘Hier ist der Londoner Rundfunk’ [‘This 
is Radio London’] to the clarion call ‘Hier ist England! Hier ist England! Hier ist 
England!’ [‘This is England! This is England! This is England!’], emphasising the 
Service’s identity as a British station rather than a mouthpiece for German-speaking 
                                                 
2 See Gunda Cannon, ‘Hier ist England’ – ‘Live aus London’: Das deutsche Programm der British 
Broadcasting Corporation 1938-1988 (London: BBC External Services, 1988), p. 3. 
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émigrés.3 According to a confidential 1942 BBC report, ‘Germans might be distrusted 
in Germany because they would be regarded there as renegades, so courting in 
Germany the reaction observed in this country in the case of [Lord] Haw-Haw’.4 A 
later report on the German Service’s output confirmed that ‘the German listener is 
undoubtedly addressed with the voice of Britain to a degree unequalled in any other 
of our European Services’.5 Indeed, the term ‘voice of Britain’ can be taken quite 
literally in this context, since almost all on-air commentaries were spoken by British 
staff members, whereas German and Austrian employees were only permitted to 
voice particular parts in features, or to appear as newsreaders.6 
Whilst emphatically insisting on the German Service’s British identity, Greene 
also aimed to improve the style and quality of its German language broadcasts. 
Initially, all content was scripted in English and subsequently translated into German 
by different staff. However, in July 1941, Greene complained that a ‘good talk or a 
good news item is not infrequently spoilt by translation into long-winded German’.7 
One of Greene’s innovations was to merge the functions of Language Supervisor and 
Sub-Editor, meaning that all translations were checked by their original author to 
make the style more accessible and its effect more immediate.8 Whereas previously 
scripts had been edited in English, cutting and final edits were now performed on the 
German text to ensure that the translated item still conveyed the intended meaning. 
While émigrés such as Robert Lucas, Carl Brinitzer, and Martin Esslin (a.k.a. Julius 
                                                 
3 See Hugh Carleton Greene, interviewed by Wolfgang Labuhn, ‘“Hier ist England!”: The German 
Language Service of the BBC during WW II’, prod. Peter Schaufler, 8 May 1985 (BBC German 
Service), A33/164, Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv (DRA), Frankfurt/Main. 
4 ‘BBC German Service’, 25 March 1942, E1/758/2, BBC Written Archives Centre (BBC WAC). 
5 ‘Extract from Output Report of B.B.C. European Services dated January 10th-16th 1942’ [corrected to: 
1943], p. 2, E1/758/2, BBC WAC. 
6 See Cannon, p. 6. 
7 Memo from Hugh Carleton Greene to European News Editor, subject: ‘Suggestions for 
Reorganisation of German Service’, 17 July 1941, R13/148/2, BBC WAC. 




Pereszlenyi) now provided most of the scripts, every single one of these still ‘had to 
be read, checked and passed by a British subject in a leading position before it was 
allowed to go on the air’.9 In the interests of security, the BBC also assigned switch 
censors to each of its foreign service departments, who monitored broadcasts and 
were empowered to switch off microphones in an emergency.10 
The Nazis attempted to jam British radio propaganda by broadcasting 
interference noises on the same wavelength. Following a trip to Stockholm in August 
1942 to assess the impact of jamming on BBC transmissions, Greene made further 
changes to the German Service. He concluded that broadcasts were audible even 
during intense jamming, but that the noise had a tiring effect on listeners, which 
necessitated stylistic changes.11 Greene insisted on clear, slower delivery, reducing 
the number of words per minute. He sought out presenters with ‘deep resonant voices 
rather than high pitched voices’.12 News bulletins were now read by two announcers 
presenting alternate items, and elaborate features using complicated effects were 
eliminated entirely. Moreover, Greene claimed that he and his staff had ‘invented a 
new German style’, abolishing long, complicated syntax, and favouring precision and 
clarity over beauty of expression.13  
The main way in which the German Service aimed to attract listeners was its 
claim to be the voice of truth. In December 1938, the BBC’s magazine The Listener 
had proclaimed that the Service would provide ‘plain, unvarnished news rather than 
[…] sensationalism or propaganda’.14 The Service hoped that by truthfully reporting 
                                                 
9 Alfred Starckmann, ‘Changing the Guard: The Transition from Emigrés to Recruits on the Staff of the 
BBC’s German Service’, in ‘Stimme der Wahrheit’: German-Language Broadcasting by the BBC, ed. 
by Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), pp. 185–195 (p. 188). 
10 See Cannon, p. 4. 
11 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 
12 Hugh Greene, ‘Visit to Stockholm in 1942’, 18 September 1963, E1/758/2, BBC WAC. 
13 Hugh Carleton Greene, interviewed by Labuhn, ‘Hier ist England!’. 
14 ‘News for Foreigners’, The Listener, 8 December 1938, p. 1228. 
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Britain’s losses, failures, and military defeats, it would acquire a reputation as an 
accurate source of information which could then also be believed when it announced 
Allied victories and advances.15 The stylistic implications of this were a calm, 
measured delivery by all speakers and a ‘matter-of-fact tone in the commentaries’ to 
contrast with the hectoring sounds of Nazi programmes.16 A 1942 report on the 
German Service recorded that ‘[e]xaggeration, excitement, threats and extravagance 
in all forms were avoided’.17 
Although the BBC aimed to set itself apart from Nazi broadcasts by avoiding 
exaggeration, its claims to truth, authenticity, and objectivity were nevertheless part 
of a larger propaganda strategy (as Stephanie Seul makes clear in her chapter).18 In a 
1940 policy paper, Greene set out the German Service’s key objectives as: ‘1) to 
convince the audience that we are likely to win; 2) to make them want us to win’.19 
The double-edged nature of this mission was elaborated a little more in a 1943 report, 
stating that the German Service consistently aimed 
to break down the will to fight of the German people by convincing 
them that defeat is certain, but that defeat at the hands of the Allies 
would not have intolerable consequences for the ordinary citizen. In 
short, […] to provide a judicious blend of ‘despair’ and ‘hope’ 
propaganda.20 
 
While accurate and up-to-date news remained at the heart of all programming, this 
mixture of ‘despair and hope propaganda’ was achieved through a variety of other 
formats, including talks, satirical features, discussions, and music, as well as a weekly 
                                                 
15 See Gerard Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp. 90–91, 
16 Mansell, pp. 163–64; see also Cannon, p.10. 
17 ‘BBC German Service’, 25 March 1942, E1/758/2, BBC WAC. 
18 See Stephanie Seul, ‘“Plain, unvarnished news”? The BBC German Service and Chamberlain’s 
Propaganda Campaign Directed at Nazi Germany, 1938-1940’, Media History, 21 (2015), 378–396 (p. 
380). 
19 Hugh Carleton Greene, ‘Layout of BBC Broadcasts in German’, 3 Sep 1940, p. 1, E1/758/1, BBC 
WAC. 
20 ‘Extract from Output Report of B.B.C. European Services dated January 10 th-16th 1942’ [corrected 
to: 1943], E1/758/2, BBC WAC. 
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round-up of events in Britain (‘England diese Woche’). The common denominator 





Since listening to the BBC from within Germany and Nazi-occupied territories was 
necessarily a clandestine activity, it is extremely difficult to estimate the number of 
listeners during the war years – and harder still to make conclusive statements about 
their identity. Several sources put forward a figure of ten to fifteen million listeners 
for the last year of the war, but in the absence of reliable data this is difficult to 
corroborate.22 Two factors, however, suggest that listenership in Germany was 
significant throughout the war: 1) the high penalties imposed on clandestine listeners 
by the Nazi regime, and 2) the Nazis’ persistent attempts at broadcast jamming, which 
specifically targeted programmes transmitted from London. There is little doubt that 
listenership increased from autumn 1941 onwards, as the tide of war began to turn and 
German broadcasters attempted to conceal German defeats and losses.23 
 While the German Service could never be sure of who was actually listening 
during the war years, it did have a very clear notion of its intended listenership. In a 
1985 interview, Hugh Greene claimed that the wartime German Service had been 
aimed at Germany’s ‘entire population, whether Nazi or non-Nazi’.24 He maintained 
that while the active opposition to Nazism within Germany had been a tiny minority, 
                                                 
21 ‘BBC German Service’, 25 March 1942, E1/758/2, BBC WAC. 
22 See Asa Briggs, The BBC: The First Fifty Years (Oxford: OUP, 1985), p. 236; Cannon, p. 10; Robert 
Lucas, ‘The German Service of the BBC’, 7 May 1983, p. 37, RLU 3/1/55, Robert Lucas Papers, 
Institute of Modern Languages Research, University of London. 
23 See Cannon, pp. 9–10. 
24 Hugh Carleton Greene, interviewed by Labuhn, ‘Hier ist England!’. 
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‘there was a large number of people who were generally against it’, and that ‘a Nazi 
could be turned around’.25 Although contemporary statements regarding German 
attitudes to Nazism were less optimistic, there was a general consensus that the BBC 
should address itself to ordinary Germans and judiciously differentiate between 
warmongering Nazis and the supposedly peaceful German population – something the 
Ministry of Information was also determined to do.26 A 1943 BBC report on the 
European Services’ output stated: ‘We have always made a distinction between the 
German war machine and the German people’.27  
Indeed, when Hugh Greene was pushing for a complete restructuring of the 
Service’s translation practices in August 1941, he used precisely this argument to 
justify his reorganisation plans: 
In connection with my proposal that the final subbing of German Talks 
and News should be done in German, I think it is worth while to bring 
to your attention an example of the sort of thing that occurs daily as a 
result of subbing, translating and language supervising functions being 
entirely separated. 
  The following sentences occurred this morning in a story 
included in our 10.00 a.m. bulletin: ‘The Berlin wireless was careful 
yesterday not to mention German losses during this period. German 
losses at British hands since June 22nd have in fact amounted to 448 
aircraft …’ These sentences were translated as follows: – 
‘Der Berliner Rundfunk hütet sich wohlweislich, die Verluste 
zu erwähnen, die die Deutschen während dieser Zeitspanne erlitten 
haben. Tatsächlich haben die Deutschen seit dem 22. Juni durch die 
Royal Air Force 448 Flugzeuge eingebüßt.’ 
  You will note that the use of the phrase ‘die Deutschen’ gives 
the German translation a slightly different shade of meaning to the 
original English. This is much more noticeable when listening in than 
when reading it. This is admittedly a small point. But it is the sort of 
small point which matters a great deal at a time when we are trying to 
avoid identifying the Germans with their rulers.28 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Seul, p. 385. 
27 ‘Extract from Output Report of B.B.C. European Services dated January 10 th-16th 1942’ [corrected 
to: 1943], E1/758/2, BBC WAC. 
28 Memo from Hugh Carleton Greene to Overseas News Editor, subject: ‘German Reorganisation 
Scheme’, 23 August 1941, R13/148/2, BBC WAC. 
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In Greene’s view, the German translation placed too much emphasis on the fact that 
‘the Germans’ had sustained significant losses at the hands of the RAF. If rephrased 
to show that ‘the Nazis’ or ‘the Third Reich’ had lost large numbers of aircraft, the 
item would sound more like a strategic military report with the emphasis squarely on 
the material disadvantage of the enemy. This would also be closer in tone to the 
original English bulletin. By contrast, broadcasting the fact that ‘the Germans’ had 
lost almost 450 aircraft shifts the focus to the human cost in German lives destroyed 
when their planes were shot down by the British. This is further emphasized through 
the use of the participle ‘erlitten’, a derivative of the verb leiden [to suffer], even 
though the original does not use the phrase ‘to suffer losses’. In this instance, Greene 
was probably right to be so particular about phrasing. The German translation comes 
close to stating bluntly the unspeakable paradox underlying the German Service’s 
mission: convincing ordinary Germans that Britain had their best interests at heart, 
when every day the country was taking direct action to kill more Germans. 
 
Telling the Truth about Bombing 
 
Aspiring to be the voice of truth entailed reporting as accurately as possible on 
Britain’s losses during the early war years. However, as the tide of war began to turn 
and Allied troops gradually gained the upper hand following the German disaster at 
Stalingrad, the German Service faced a new dilemma: how to convince Germans of 
the righteousness of the British cause while the British were carpet-bombing their 
cities and killing thousands of civilians. As more and more German cities came within 
range of Allied bombers, Germans were now witnessing first-hand the devastation of 
war and its impact on civilians.  
9 
 
The BBC did not attempt to shroud the air war in silence. Of almost 1,000 
extant features scripts for the period from January 1943 to December 1944, over 
eleven per cent focused wholly or partly on the bombing of German cities.29 Although 
these programmes were never the main output, since they were intended as bait to get 
people to listen to the news, they nevertheless provide a rich corpus for analysis. They 
ranged from detached, factual reports to invented scenarios and dialogues, the scripts 
employed a range of different strategies for broaching the sensitive topic of bombing. 
The satirical features in particular were much less constrained by form than the news 
bulletins, being fictional in the first place. Comedy series such as ‘Kurt und Willi’, 
‘Frau Wernicke’ (both scripted by Bruno Adler), and ‘The Letters of Corporal 
Hirnschal’ (by Robert Lucas) played an important part in achieving the BBC’s ‘blend 
of “despair” and “hope” propaganda’ by adopting relatable, average Germans as their 
protagonists, who could voice German listeners’ everyday worries and fears. The 
following analysis of individual features scripts provides insights into the different 
strategies the German Service used to talk about the bombing war, the Service’s 
attitude to the German population during the later war years, and the important tonal 
distinctions between different formats dealing with the same issue.  
One of the most frequently used formats for reporting on the bombing war was 
to give factual information on targets and numbers of bombs dropped. Many scripts 
simply listed recently targeted cities or numbers of aircraft produced by different 
countries.30 Others stressed the considerable advantage in air power Britain and the 
U.S. had gained over the Luftwaffe between 1940 and 1943 by giving updates on 
                                                 
29 The corpus analysed comprises a total of 976 features scripts for January 1943 to December 1944, of 
which 66 were wholly and 42 partly concerned with the bombing war. Unfortunately, the features 
scripts for January to June 1945 (the period including some of the most destructive raids, e.g. Dresden) 
have been lost. 
30 See e.g. Julius Pereszlenyi, ‘Bombing Range’, prod. Julius Gellner, 11 August 1943, German Service 
Scripts: Features (July–December 1943), BBC WAC. 
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recent war production figures.31 When reporting on the air war, the German Service 
constantly sought to keep the focus on tactical and technical details rather than on the 
human lives lost. The MOI similarly emphasised technical detail in its ‘Official War 
Books’ series, which became highly popular, as readers felt they were being trusted 
with accurate information. In the BBC’s case, focusing on the technical aspects of 
warfare enabled the German Service to point out Britain’s superiority and the likely 
course the air war would take, without drawing too much attention to the fact that 
thousands of German civilians were losing their lives as a consequence of British 
actions. The number of scripts drawing on the list format indicates that it was one of 
the most commonly used for features during the war years. This in itself, however, is 
remarkable, since it is hard to imagine such lists and comparisons of figures providing 
a particularly engaging listener experience. One of the format’s advantages was that it 
squarely fulfilled the aim of providing ‘straight’ and unbiased news. However, these 
types of scripts could offer little independently verifiable evidence to a listener in 
Germany, and might therefore easily have been dismissed as British propaganda. 
Another way in which the BBC German Service sought to focus more on 
technical detail and less on the human cost of air raids was to stress in almost every 
broadcast that Britain was specifically and exclusively aiming at industrial targets. A 
broadcast on ‘Bombing and Production’ by Martin Esslin from June 1943 spelt out 
the aims of Britain’s bombing campaign in Germany. It cited German military 
correspondence claiming that: ‘The aim pursued by the British leadership through its 
air raids on Germany is undoubtedly to bring the armaments industry to a standstill’.32 
The script went on to explain why air raids were particularly focused on the Ruhr: 
                                                 
31 See e.g. ‘England diese Woche’, no. 77, 3 September 1943, pp. 5–6, German Service Scripts: 
Features (July–December 1943), BBC WAC. 
32 ‘Das Ziel, das die britische Führung mit ihren Luftangriffen auf Deutschland verfolgt, ist 
unzweifelhaft das, die Rüstungsindustrie lahmzulegen.’ Julius Pereszlenyi, ‘Bombing and Production’, 
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2nd VOICE The Ruhr is the largest industrial area of the European 
mainland… 
1st VOICE In 1932, the Ruhr was responsible for almost 75% of 
coal produced in Germany. 
2nd VOICE The Ruhr was responsible for almost 80% of steel 
produced in Germany. 
NARRATOR One cannot move mines to the East. Nor can one move 
furnaces. In the Ruhr a significant part of German 
armament potential remains crammed into an area 
vulnerable to Allied air raids.33 
 
Whilst adhering to factually accurate information, the report skilfully avoids any 
mention of the fact that the Ruhr is also one of Germany’s most densely populated 
areas, and that the repeated air raids on it endangered countless civilians’ lives. This 
strategy was repeated shortly after air raids on Berlin had begun, with a script from 
September 1943 claiming that ‘while the Ruhr is Europe’s largest centre for heavy 
industry, Berlin is the largest European centre for light industry’.34 Esslin’s script 
explained that strategic air raids were necessary because ‘40% of Berlin’s population, 
i.e. over 2 million people, work in the war industry’, but it made no mention of the 
fact that these people would potentially be killed, or at best rendered homeless by the 
air raids on their city.35 The vast majority of scripts dealing with the air war in 1943–
1944 instead stressed Britain’s systematic and precise approach to bombing, even 
though by this point the British had given up on the ideal of bombing accuracy and 
                                                                                                                                           
prod. Julius Gellner, 24 June 1943, German Service Scripts: Features (January–June 1943), BBC 
WAC. 
33 ‘2. VOICE Das Ruhrgebiet ist der gewaltigste Industriebezirk des europäischen Festlandes ... 
1. VOICE Das Ruhrgebiet lieferte 1932 fast 75% der in Deutschland gewonnenen Steinkohle. 
2. VOICE Das Ruhrgebiet lieferte fast 80% des in Deutschland erzeugten Stahls. 
NARRATOR Bergwerke kann man nicht nach dem Osten verlegen. Auch Hochöfen nicht. Im 
Ruhrgebiet ist und bleibt ein wesentlicher Teil des deutschen Rüstungspotentials 
auf engstem Raum den alliierten Luftangriffen ausgesetzt.’ Ibid. 
34 ‘[…] während das Ruhrgebiet das größte Zentrum der Schwerindustrie Europas ist, ist Berlin das 
größte europäische Zentrum für Leichtindustrie.’ Julius Pereszlenyi, ‘Topical Berlin’, prod. H.W. 
Buxbaum, 2 September 1943, German Service Scripts: Features (July–December 1943), BBC WAC. 
35 ‘40% der Bevölkerung Berlins, also über 2.000.000 Menschen arbeiten in der Kriegsindustrie.’ Ibid. 
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were instead undertaking a policy of bombing at night-time to reduce morale.36 In 
these scripts, ‘ordinary’ Germans figured only in their capacity as workers, not as 
potential victims. 
As Allied bombing of German cities intensified over the course of 1943, the 
German Service frequently directed listeners’ attention to the past by stressing that it 
was the Nazis who had first used the ruthless practice of carpet-bombing as part of 
their Blitzkrieg strategy, and that consequently the German Reich was reaping what it 
had sown. This was a somewhat harsh message to convey to ‘ordinary’ Germans 
experiencing bombing for the first time. One might expect that listeners would not 
respond well to being told they deserved their current suffering. One way of driving 
this message home without affronting listeners was to embed it in a comedy feature, 
which could take more liberties than a factual broadcast. The ‘Frau Wernicke’ series, 
written by Bruno Adler and read by actress Annemarie Haase, centred around a 
garrulous Berlin housewife, who was supposedly devoted to the Fatherland, but 
whose rants about recent events often betrayed a dislike and distrust of the Nazi 
leaders. On the subject of bombing, Frau Wernicke contrasted the Germans’ attitude 
at the beginning of the war with more recent reactions: 
Well, back then, when the Luftwaffe was superior, we cheered when 
the English cities burned. I mean, I didn’t really notice much of this 
cheering, perhaps because I don’t really mix with the better folk, only 
with the good ones – but I did read about it in our papers, that we were 
apparently filled with the deepest gratification. And what back then 
was just settling accounts and punishment on our part, today that’s 
considered cowardice, meanness, and terror from the other side. And 
why? Well, obviously, cos now they’re the stronger ones.37 
                                                 
36 See Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013); Dietmar 
Süß, Tod aus der Luft: Kriegsgesellschaft und Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England (Munich: Siedler, 
2011). 
37 ‘Ja, damals, wie de Luftwaffe ieberlejen war, da ham wa jejubelt, wenn de englischen Städte jebrannt 
haben. Ick hab zwar nicht jemerkt von den Jubel, vielleicht weil ick nicht mit de bessern Leute 
vakehre, lieber bloß mit de juten – aber jelesen ha’ck et in unsre Zeitungen, det wa alle erfüllt waren 
von de tiefste Jenuchtuung. Und wat damals von uns bloß Abrechnung und Strafjericht war det is heute 




Although Frau Wernicke reminds the listener that ‘we cheered when the English cities 
burned’, she is quick to qualify the pronoun ‘we’ by stressing that she never really 
witnessed this celebratory attitude and only learned how she was supposed to react 
from the newspapers. She suspects that the reason for this is her exclusion from high 
society – the implication being that high-ranking Nazis would have celebrated 
military victories while the majority of the population carried on as normal. Through 
a play on words, the script distinguishes between ‘the better sort’, with whom Frau 
Wernicke has no contact, and ‘the good’, whom she prefers. Within the same 
sentence, the meaning of ‘good’ shifts from ‘wealthy’ or ‘upper class’ to ‘morally 
upstanding’ or ‘kind’, suggesting that ordinary Germans like Frau Wernicke have a 
better moral compass than their leaders and would not have rejoiced at British 
suffering at the beginning of the war, but that they are now forced to suffer the 
consequences of their leaders’ actions. 
The differences between Nazi leadership and ordinary Germans were a 
recurring theme of various satirical features, including the ‘Kurt und Willi’ series, 
also scripted by Adler and set in Berlin. Kurt was a naïve school teacher, whose best 
friend Willi worked for the propaganda ministry and could therefore enlighten him as 
to what was truly going on in Nazi Germany. In a script from December 1943, the 
two meet not in their usual café on Potsdamer Platz but in a run-down remote bar, 
because – as Willi informs Kurt – the intensifying air raids on Berlin mean that ‘not 
                                                                                                                                           
Bruno Adler, ‘Frau Wernicke on Bombing, Führer’s Health etc.’, prod. Julius Gellner, 13 March 1943, 
German Service Scripts: Features (January–June 1943), BBC WAC. 
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even the bank vaults are safe anymore’.38 This leads Kurt and Willi to discuss the 
impact of the most recent raids on Berlin: 
WILLI My God, do you have any idea what kind of catastrophic 
confusion there’s been in the better circles since the 
large banks have been hit?! 
KURT Well, to be honest, Willi, the fellow citizens with whom 
I’ve been spending these past dreadful nights aren’t 
overly concerned with that. They’re happy that they just 
about made it out alive.39 
 
By using the two friends as examples, the broadcast stresses the diverging priorities of 
different social classes as concerns the effects of bombing: while high ranking 
officials are mainly concerned with the security of their assets and accumulated 
wealth, ordinary Germans consider themselves lucky if they can escape a raid alive. 
 Another way of highlighting the gap between Nazi officials and ordinary 
people was to contrast responses of the British and German leadership to the bombing 
of civilian targets. In a July 1943 broadcast, the Head of the features department 
Marius Goring (under his pseudonym Charles Richardson) stressed that the London 
Blitz had served to strengthen the unity of purpose between the British people and 
their government: 
The way in which King George, the Queen, and Winston Churchill 
observed the progress of the attacks, personally supporting practical aid 
on the ground again and again, is only one symbol of this unity.40 
 
                                                 
38 ‘Nicht mal die Bankgewölbe sind mehr sicher.’ Bruno Adler, ‘Kurt and Willi: Bombing and 
Conferences’, prod. H.W. Buxbaum, 7 December 1943, German Service Scripts: Features (July–
December 1943), BBC WAC. 
39 ‘WILLI Mensch, hast du ne Ahnung, was für ne katastrophale Verwirrung in den besseren 
Kreisen herrscht, seit die Grossbanken getroffen worden sind?! 
KURT Also – um die Wahrheit zu sagen, Willi – die Volksgenossen, mit denen ich in 
diesen Schreckensnächten zu tun hatte, sind davon nicht übermäßig beunruhigt. Die 
sind froh, dass sie ihr nacktes Leben retten konnten.’ Ibid. 
40 ‘Die Art wie König Georg, die Königin und Winston Churchill den Verlauf der Angriffe verfolgten, 
wie sie immer wieder persönlich an Ort und Stelle für Hilfsmaßnahmen sorgten, ist nur ein Zeichen 
dieser Einheit.’ Julius Pereszlenyi, ‘The Third Dimension’, prod. H.W. Buxbaum, 10 July 1943, 
German Service Scripts: Features (July–December 1943), BBC WAC. 
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The German Service contrasted the British leadership’s caring attitude with Hitler’s 
cynical disregard for human lives lost in his quest for power – again using Frau 
Wernicke as a mouthpiece. In a fictional (and entirely one-sided) conversation 
between Frau Wernicke and Ivan, the Ukrainian waiter in her local Berlin pub, she is 
keen to stress Hitler’s concern for bombing victims: 
But don’t you go thinking that it’s just us that are worried about our 
bombed out fellow citizens, our Adolf himself is too. And just so you 
have an idea of how worried he is – just the other day after the heavy 
attack on Bochum, where apparently it rained down thousand-kilo-
bombs like leaflets, he was so terribly worried that he … well, what do 
you think he did in his pain? 
No, no, you’ll never guess: he TELEPHONED! Believe it or 
not! Just imagine, he phoned up Gauleiter Hoffmann, actually phoned 
him, and asked how it’s all going in Bochum…41 
 
Not only does the monologue convey some factual information (i.e. there has recently 
been a significant air raid on Bochum), but Wernicke’s praise for Hitler’s reaction is 
structured as a guessing game for her interlocutor, thus building up suspense by 
delaying the reveal of what Hitler actually did after the raid. This build up of tension 
is followed by a deflating let-down, in which Hitler’s action of telephoning the local 
administrator functions as a kind of punch line to stress its complete inadequacy as a 
response to the victims’ suffering. 
 This script also directly compares Hitler’s reaction with that of the British 
leadership, when Wernicke repeats what her interlocutor Ivan has supposedly 
interjected:  
                                                 
41 ‘Aber jloob nich, det bloß wir uns sorjen um de ausjebombten Volksjenossen, det tut sojar unser 
Adolf höchstpersönlich. Und damit du dir nen Bejriff machst, wie der sich sorgt – neulich nach den 
schweren Anjriff uf Bochum, wo et de Tausendkilobomben bloß so jeregnet haben soll wie Flugblätter, 
da hat er sich so furchtbar jesorgt, det er ... na wat denkste, wat der in sein’ Schmerz jemacht hat! 
Nee nee, det errätste nich: TELEFONIERT hat er! Ob’s de’s jloobst oder nich! Stell dir det bloß mal 
vor, den Jauleiter Hoffman hat er anjerufen, richtig anjerufen und jefragt, wie et denn so jeht in 
Bochum...’ Bruno Adler, ‘Frau Wernicke on Air Raid Victims and the Führer’, prod. Julius Gellner, 26 
June 1943, German Service Scripts: Features (January–June 1943), BBC WAC. 
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Churchill, that old stuffed shirt, goes to see the people after an air raid, 
you say, and even the English King and Queen clamber about in the 
ruins? Gosh, just imagine, if our Führer stood at the graves of the 
victims – what do you reckon would happen! What – what’s that you 
say? – Bloody hell, they’d push him in? Well, you’re a fine one – that 
leaves even me gobsmacked!42 
 
The question of what would happen if Hitler went to mourn at the graveside of recent 
bombing victims sets up the next joke, which is reported second-hand from Ivan who 
remains just out of earshot. Thus, Frau Wernicke’s own belief in the Führer is not 
called into question, but she is still forced to parrot the curmudgeonly suggestion that 
many Germans might be tempted to push Hitler into a grave alongside the civilian 
victims. Although her reaction to this is one of shock, Wernicke does not contradict 
Ivan or suggest that what he is saying constitutes treason. The script sets up a sense of 
complicity with its listeners, inviting them to share in a gleeful, illicit thought 
experiment of simply disposing of Hitler in the manner of a slapstick comedy gag. 
 An interesting exception to the rule of using humour to discuss the effects of 
bombing on ordinary Germans was a script for the women’s programme from July 
1943, which focused on the fact that Hitler’s disastrous Russian campaign was 
keeping German men far away from their families. After presenting an old song from 
Westphalia, the narrator muses: 
I can imagine that the soldiers from Westphalia are particularly 
homesick for their wives and families, for today the gigantic battle over 
Germany’s heavy industry is being fought over Westphalia, over the 
Ruhr.43 
 
                                                 
42 ‘Der Tschurtschill, der olle Waschlappen, der jeht nach nem Luftanjriff zu de Bevölkerung, sagste, 
und sojar der englische König und de Könjin steijen in de Ruinen rum? Mensch, mal dir doch det mal 
aus, wenn unser Führer an dem Jrab von de Opfer stünde – wat gloobste wat da passieren würde! Wat – 
wat sagste? – Heiljer Strohsack, rinschubsen würden se ihm? Mensch, du bist ne Nummer – da bleibt 
sojar mir de Spucke weg!’ Ibid. 
43 ‘[…] ich kann mir vorstellen, dass die Soldaten aus Westfalen sich besonders nach Hause sehnen zu 
ihren Frauen und Familien, denn über Westfalen, über der Ruhr tobt heute die gewaltige Schlacht um 
Deutschlands Schwerindustrie.’ Julius Pereszlenyi, ‘A Song of Woe’, prod. H.W. Buxbaum, 8 July 
1943, German Service Scripts: Features (July–December 1943), BBC WAC. 
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The bombing of the Ruhr is still associated with heavy industry, but the script’s focus 
is specifically on these men’s attachment to their loved ones, who are in peril due to 
the British air raids: 
These men in the East are at the front and they know that their wives at 
home are also at the front. Two-thousand kilometres lie between these 
fronts and the men cannot get home to see how their families are 
doing.44 
 
Instead of detailing what could potentially have happened to the soldiers’ wives while 
their husbands are away on the Eastern front, the broadcast describes the wives 
themselves as being ‘at the front’, thus also turning them into combatants. This 
description of the two fronts emphasises the danger both parties face, but does so 
without dwelling on their emotional responses to it. The script walks a fine line 
between acknowledging the men’s fears for their families’ safety and not providing 
any concrete detail on the dangers they face as a consequence of British raids. 
 The script that dealt most explicitly with the air war’s impact on people’s lives 
was once again a satirical feature. Robert Lucas’s series ‘The Letters of Corporal 
Hirnschal’ was an epistolary comedy feature in which a simple soldier, Adolf 
Hirnschal, wrote to his wife Amalia, detailing his naïve and fervent belief in the 
righteousness of the Führer’s cause, but simultaneously exposing the glaring 
contradictions between Nazi ideology and wartime reality. In this particular letter, 
Hirnschal reports a conversation with his fellow soldier Katting, who owns a farm in 
Westphalia:  
‘Hirnschal,’ says tall Katting all of a sudden, ‘How long is this going to 
go on for? What are we actually fighting for?’ And I answer him: 
‘They say we’re fighting for our beloved German homeland.’ – ‘Then 
why are we stuck here in Russia,’ says Katting, ‘thousands of 
kilometres from our “homeland”, while the bombs are falling on our 
cities?’ I get a bit nervous at that and answer: ‘They also say we’re 
                                                 
44 ‘[…] diese Männer im Osten stehen an der Front und sie wissen, dass auch ihre Frauen zu hause an 
der Front sind, zweitausend Kilometer liegen zwischen diesen Fronten und die Männer können nicht 
heim, zu sehen wie es ihrer Familie geht.’ Ibid. 
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fighting for our families, Katting.’ At that Katting sits up and says: 
‘Then why don’t we just go home, now that our families are in danger? 
That’s our damn duty, Hirnschal, we can’t just leave our wives and 
children in the lurch in their hour of need.’ – At that I shake my head 
and say: ‘You don’t understand, Katting. Our beloved Führer can’t let 
that happen. If we all go home, who’s going to fight the Bolsheviks 
and the plutocrats? The whole war will be over if we just go home.’ 
But at that tall Katting jumps up all excited and says: ‘Damn right, 
Hirnschal, then the whole war will be over, and if the war is over, then 
our families will no longer be in danger.’45 
 
By transposing them into a comic mode, the script is able to voice an ordinary 
soldier’s fears about his family’s safety, whilst simultaneously exposing the absurdity 
of attempting to defend the German homeland and the German people on the remote 
Russian front. Katting’s concern at not being able to help his family in their ‘hour of 
need’ is genuine and relatable, thus undermining Hirnschal’s increasingly paradoxical 
claims as to what they are fighting for. The logical conclusion Katting draws from 
Hirnschal’s explanations that if they all go home, ‘then the whole war will be over, 
and if the war is over, then our families will no longer be in danger’, reads rather like 
a simplified summary of the BBC German Service’s aims and objectives. 
 
A common thread running through all the BBC German Service’s policy decisions 
and scriptwriting choices during wartime was its aim to speak to (and perhaps for) a 
broad audience of ordinary Germans. The analysis of features scripts shows that in 
                                                 
45 ‘“Hirnschal,” sagt auf einmal der lange Katting, “Wie lang wird das noch so weitergehen? Wofür 
kämpfen wir denn eigentlich?” Und ich antworte: “Sie sagen, wir kämpfen für unsere deutsche 
Heimat.” – “Warum sitzen wir dann hier in Russland,” meint drauf der Katting, “tausende Kilometer 
von unserer ‘Heimat’ entfernt, wenn die Bomben auf unsere Städte fallen?” Darauf werde ich ein 
wenig nervös und antworte: “Sie sagen auch, wir kämpfen für unsere Familien, Katting.” Darauf setzt 
sich der Katting auf und sagt: “Warum gehen wir dann nicht gleich nach Hause, wo unsere Familien 
jetzt in Gefahr sind? Das ist doch unsere verdammte Pflicht und Schuldigkeit, Hirnschal, wir dürfen 
doch unsere Frauen und Kinder in der Stunde der Not nicht im Stich lassen.” – Darauf schüttle ich den 
Kopf und sage: “Das verstehst du nicht, Katting. Das kann doch unser geliebter Führer nicht zulassen. 
Wenn wir alle nach Hause gehen, wer wird denn dann gegen die Bolschewiken und gegen die 
Plutokraten kämpfen? Dann ist doch der ganze Krieg zu Ende, wenn wir einfach nach Hause gehen.” 
Aber da springt der lange Katting ganz aufgeregt auf und sagt: “Ganz richtig, Hirnschal, dann ist der 
Krieg zu Ende, und wenn der Krieg zu Ende ist, dann sind doch unsere Familien nicht mehr in 
Gefahr.”’ Robert Ehrenzweig [a.k.a. Robert Lucas], ‘Hirnschal Letter No. 64’, prod. Julius Gellner, 28 
June 1943, German Service Scripts: Features (January–June 1943), BBC WAC. 
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regard to the complex issue of British air raids, the German Service was forced to 
walk a very fine line between supporting British military strategy and convincing 
Germans that it was their leaders not they themselves who were under attack – despite 
appearances to the contrary. One reason for this was the BBC’s need to attract a 
German audience in unfavourable conditions. Accusing all Germans of having started 
the war was hardly a good way to garner new listeners or to keep the existing ones 
interested. However, reporting somewhat accurately on the bombing war without 
making German listeners feel victimised by the British was a difficult task: the BBC 
therefore attempted to redirect its listeners’ resentment for the air raids away from the 
British government and towards the Nazi leadership.  
In its quest to appeal to the broadest possible audience within enemy territory, 
the BBC German Service tried to address a fictional category of “ordinary” Germans, 
who were neither Nazi officials, nor part of the active political opposition, nor 
persecuted minorities, but still politically interested enough to risk listening to enemy 
broadcasts. These exclusionary factors are similar to Elizabeth Heineman’s findings 
on how Germans tend to categorise their experiences when being interviewed for 
histories of everyday life in wartime and postwar Germany: 
Histories of everyday life and oral histories often attest to the ways 
non-persecuted and non-activist Germans recall a past of ‘ordinary 
Germans’ that excludes the experience of the persecuted and the 
activists, who numbered in the millions. This opposition of ‘ordinary 
Germans’ to the ‘others’ has helped to create an apparently 
homogenous category of ‘ordinary Germans’ that downplays 
significant differences among them.46 
 
Instead of a retrospective categorisation by Germans themselves during the postwar 
era, the BBC’s (and MOI’s) explicit strategy of distinguishing between Nazis and 
                                                 
46 Elizabeth Heineman, ‘The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany’s “Crisis Years” and West 
German National Identity’, The American Historical Review 101 (1996), 354–395 (p. 357). 
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‘ordinary Germans’ suggests that this was a viewpoint already encouraged through 
British propaganda during the war. A variety of different programmes invited 
listeners to identify with a fictional German ‘man on the street’, and thus encouraged 
listeners to think of themselves as ‘ordinary Germans’ – a category whose main 
characteristics included war-weariness and disillusionment with the Nazi leadership. 
This potentially enabled any Germans who did not feel they had benefited sufficiently 
from the war to consider themselves victims of Nazi oppression rather than fellow-
travellers and enablers of a monstrous regime. In this way, the BBC German Service 
may well have played a significant role in constructing one of postwar Germany’s 
founding myths, by inventing a new kind of German to suit its wartime output. 
 
 
 
 
